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I. INTRODUCTION

It is no news that some corporations engage in social irresponsibility
in the form of human and labor rights violations and environmental
degradation in developing countries. Transnational corporations (TNCs),
particularly those in the apparel industry, have been accused of engaging
workers, including children, under deplorable "sweatshop" conditions in
Asia' and South America.' Similarly, in Africa, TNCs in the extractive
industries have provided arms, weapons, finance and transportation to
repressive security agencies and insurgent groups in return for economic
favors.' These facilities are often used for human rights infractions.4 In
1. See Saadia Toor, ChildLabourin Pakistan: Coming ofAge in the New WorldOrder,575
ANNALS 194, 218-19 (2001); Bhavin Patel, Comment, The Effects of ChildLabor on the Family
in Asian Countries, 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 481 (2000).
2. Human Rights Watch, Turning a Blind Eye: Hazardous ChildLabor in El Salvador's
Sugarcane Cultivation (June 2004), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/elsalvador0604/
(visited Nov. 28, 2006). For insight on the problem of "sweatshops" in the apparel industry, see
generally ELLEN I. ROSEN, MAKING SWEATSHOPS: GLOBALIZATION OF U.S. APPAREL INDUSTRY
(2002).
3. For insight, see generally Global Witness, The Logs of War: The Timber Trade and
Armed Conflict (2002) [hereinafter Global Witness, The Logs of War], availableat http://www.
globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00044.pdf(last visited Nov. 28, 2006); Christian Dietrich,
HardCurrency:The CriminalizedDiamondEconomyof the DemocraticRepublic ofthe Congoand
Its Neighbours (2002), availableat http://www.pacweb.org/e/pdf/hc-report-e.pdf(last visited Nov.
28, 2006); Global Witness, All the Presidents'Men: The DevastatingStory of Oil and Banking in
Angola's PrivatisedWar (2002) [hereinafter Global Witness, All the Presidents'Men],available
at http://www.globalwitness.org/reports/download.php/00027.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006);
Report of the Panelof Experts Appointed Pursuantto Security CouncilResolution 1306 (2000),
Paragraph19, in Relation to Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. Number S/2000/1195, available at http://
www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/SierraLeone/SLselectedEng.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006);
FinalReport of the Panelof Experts on the Illegal Exploitationof NaturalResources and Other
Forms of Wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo, U.N. Doc. Number S/2002/1146 (2002),
availableat http://www.un.dk/doc/S20021146.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006).
4. In Nigeria, for example, the 1999 mass killings and destruction of property at Opia and
Ikenya communities were carried out by Nigerian soldiers with the aid of boats, helicopters, pilots,
and crew allegedly provided by Chevron. See California Global Corporate Accountability Project,
Beyond Good Deeds: Case Studies and a New Policy Agenda for CorporateAccountability 36
(2002), availableat http://www.n-h-i.org/projects/peopleGlobalResources/CorpAccount/Finai%
20PUBLIC%2OPolicy0/o2OREPORT4.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2006); Human Rights Watch,
Crackdown in the Niger Delta 13-19 (May 1999), available at http://shop.store.yahoo.com/
hrwpubs/nigeria0599.html (last visited Nov. 28,2006). Similarly, in the Sudan oil TNCs operating
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addition, TNCs have consistently degraded the environment in Africa.' In
Nigeria, for example, Human Rights Watch has reported that as a result of
the activities of oil TNCs, "[i]n many villages near oil installations, even
when there has been no recent spill, an oily sheen can be seen on the
water, which in fresh water areas is usually the
6 same water that the people
washing.",
and
drinking
for
use
there
living
These instances in no way exhaust the irresponsible behavior of TNCs,
but they underscore the severity of the continuing crisis of corporate
responsibility in developing countries. Regrettably, international law is
reluctant to regulate the social conduct of TNCs, hence, the glaring
absence ofbinding international human rights obligations on corporations.7
under the auspices ofthe Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), are known to have
allowed the Sudanese military to arm and re-fuel its "helicopter gunships and Antonov bombers"
at GNPOC's Heglig airstrip "and from there attacked civilians." See Department of Foreign Affairs
& International Trade (Canada), Human Security in Sudan: The Report of a CanadianAssessment
Mission 15 (2000), available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/cansudan2.pdf (last
visited Nov. 28, 2006). See also Georgette Gagnon et al., DeconstructingEngagement: Corporate
Self-Regulation in ConflictZones-Implicationsfor Human Rights and CanadianPublicPolicy26
(Jan. 2003), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol 3/paperscfrn?abstract id=557002 (last visited
Nov. 28, 2006).
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA'S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES (1999), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/nigeria/index.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006); CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS PROJECT, LAND, OIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN NIGERIA'S DELTA REGION (1999); IKE
OKONTA & ORONTO DOUGLAS, WHERE VULTURES FEAST: SHELL, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND OIL INTHE
NIGER DELTA (2001); DANIEL LITVIN, EMPIRES OF PROFIT: COMMERCE, CONQUEST AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 249-73 (2003); Jedrzej G. Frynas, Corporateand State Responses to
Anti-Oil Protests in the Niger Delta, 100 AFR. AFF. 27 (2001).
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 67. TNCs outside of the oil and gas industry
have also been engaged in corporate irresponsibility in Nigeria. In 1996, the pharmaceutical giant,
Pfizer, experimented and tested the antibiotic Trovan on unsuspecting children in Kano, Nigeria,
without the knowledge and consent of their families. Trovan had never, before the Nigerian
experiment, been tested on children anywhere else in the world. In the end, eleven children were
said to have died while several others suffered a variety of injuries and diseases including brain
damage, paralysis, and deafnless. See Tamar Lewin, Families Sue Pfizeron Test ofAntibiotic, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, availableat http://www.mindfully.org/Industry/Pfizer-Trovan-NigerianSuit.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); NigeriansSue Pfizer Over Test Deaths, BBC NEWS, Aug.
30,2001, availableathttp://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/1 517171 .stm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006);
Joe Stephens, The Body Hunters: Exporting Human Experiments, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2000;
David M. Carr,Pfizer'sEpidemic: A Needfor InternationalRegulation ofHuman Experimentation
in Developing Countries,35 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 15 (2003); Jolyon Ford & George Tomossy,
Clinical Trials in Developing Countries: The Plaintiff's Challenge, 1 LAW, SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL
DEV. J. (2004), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_1/ford (last
visited Nov. 28, 2006).
7. See Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the U.S. for Violating
InternationalLaw, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 84 (1999) (observing that private
corporate entities, including TNCs, "bear almost no obligations under public international law");
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This position arises from both the sprawling powers of TNCs as well as
their strategic economic importance to developed and developing
countries.' This has resulted in the global triumph of a vision of society
that believes business should be allowed to, and can effectively regulate
itself for the protection of common social interests. 9
The triumph of this vision, myopic as it is, stacks the cards rather
heavily against the advent of any internationally binding regulatory regime
to control the socio-economic excesses of TNCs, particularly as regards
their operations in the developing world. ° Be that as it may, organized
civil societies have refused to accept the status quo ante as epilogue in the
quest to protect human rights, labor, and the environment from corporate

Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, Il l YALE
L.J. 443,449 (2001) (noting that international law imposes human rights obligations on states and
individuals, and arguing that such obligations should also be imposed on corporations).
8. See Joshua P. Eaton, Note, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation of
TransnationalCorporations,and the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J.
261, 277 (1997) (arguing that many countries are unlikely to support a mandatory international
environmental code of conduct for TNCs "because it would run contrary to [the) short-term
economic interests" of the developed countries and because "most developing nations are in
desperate need of foreign investment to provide jobs for their citizens and revenues for their
national governments").
9. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM:
HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 7
(2002) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY] (observing that the view
that "self-regulation and market forces were the best means to ensure respect for human rights...
has been the dominant paradigm" in international law.)
10. This is the more so because the developed countries prefer voluntary or self-regulation
by companies. This is manifested in the Voluntary Principleson SecurityandHumanRights, which
was established under the auspices of the governments of the United Kingdom and the United
States, in collaboration with TNCs and civil society organizations. See Voluntary Principles on
SecurityandHuman Rights, availableat http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/293l .htm (last visited Mar.
5,2007). In addition, the U.S. government has established the ModelBusinessPrinciples,available
at http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/teleam/global/ilo/guide/usmodel.htm (last visited Mar. 7,
2007) which prescribes voluntary labor standards for business. For its part, the Canadian
government encourages Canadian TNCs to adopt the InternationalCode ofEthicsfor Canadian
Business, available at http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/globalization/busethics/codeint.html (last
visited Mar. 7, 2007). In fact, the Canadian government has rejected a recent recommendation by
the House of Commons' Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade that
Canada should "establish clear legal norms" for holding Canadian mining companies accountable
for environmental and human rights violations associated with their operations in foreign countries.
See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Mining in Developing
Countries-CorporateSocial Responsibility: The Government 's Response to the Report of the
Standing Committee on ForeignAffairs and InternationalTrade, 8-10 (Oct. 2005), availableat
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/scfait-response-en.pdf(last visited Mar. 7,2007).
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intrusion.1" Undeterred by the enormity of the combined forces of TNCs
and the governments of the developed countries that protect them, some
national and international support is growing for an internationally binding
and enforceable regime of corporate regulation.12 In that regard, pressures
have been, and are still being, exerted on governments, international
organizations and corporations themselves. 3 In response, substantive

11. See Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for CorporateAccountability: Transatlantic
Perspectivesfrom the NGO Community, 19 AM. U. INT'LL. REv. 1265, 1268 (2004) (observing that
NGOs in Europe "are beginning to place more pressure at the national, European and international
levels for legally-binding approaches" to the regulation of TNCs).
12. See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HuMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 9, at 7-19 (urging
the international community to impose binding international legal obligations on TNCs); Friends
of the Earth International, Towards Binding CorporateAccountability (2001) (outlining the case
for establishment of legally binding social and environmental duties for corporations), available
athttp://www.foei.org/publications/corporates/accountpr.html (last visited Mar. 13,2007). See also
Christian Aid, The Need for Legally Binding Regulation of TransnationalCorporations(Feb.
2002), availableat http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/ 0202tnc/transc.htm (last visited Mar.
1,2007). In fact, the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has
proposed a binding international regulatory regime for TNCs. See U.N. Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/
Huridoca.nsf//0/64155e7e8141b38cc1 256d63002c55e8?Opendocument and athttp://wwwl .umn.
edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html (both cites last visited Mar. 7, 2007). For analysis of the
proposed Norms, see Surya Deva, UN. 'sHuman Rights Normsfor TransnationalCorporationsand
Other Business Enterprises:An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?,10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 493 (2004). It is also worth noting that some legislators in countries such as Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, have in the recent past introduced various bills in parliament
seeking to impose binding and enforceable standards of behavior on TNCs in relation to their
business operations in foreign countries. See CorporateCode of Conduct Bill 2000, available at
http://www.natural-resources.org/minerals/csr/docs/csr/Austmlia%20Corporate%2OCode%2OBill%
202000.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); CorporateResponsibility Bill, (Bill 129, U.K. House of
Commons, 2002-2003 Session), availableat http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/
cmbills/1 29/03129.i.html (last visited Mar. 7,2007); CorporateCode of Conduct Act, (H.R. 5377,
109th U.S. Congress, 2005-2006), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?
bill=h109-5377 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
13. See Bunn, supra note 11, at 1268. See also Deborah Spar & James Dail, Of Measurement
and Mission: Accountingfor Performancein Non-Governmental Organizations,3 CHI. J. INT'L L.
171, 172 (2002) (observing that pressures exerted by NGOs have forced companies such as Shell
and Nike to alter their commercial practices and to embrace social concerns); Douglass Cassel,
CorporateInitiatives:A Second Human Rights Revolution?, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963, 1978
(1996) (stating that "many of today's corporate codes for human rights were adopted following
pressure from consumers, social investors, labor, or the press, often in combination."); Gary Gereffi
et al., The NGO-IndustrialComplex, 125 FOREIGN POL'Y 56, 61 (July/Aug. 2001) (arguing that
"aggressive campaigns by labor groups, NGOs, and student activists have compelled apparel
corporations to adopt stringent codes of conduct and establish independent monitoring as well").
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attempts have been made by multilateral and international organizations
to regulate, or to influence the conduct of, TNCs.
For example, the International Labor Organization (1LO) has two
specific instruments which are intended to regulate, or at least influence,
the labor practices of TNCs and other employers. The first, Tripartite
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and
Social Policy4 encourages TNCs to promote workplace safety and to
minimize and resolve the adverse effects of their activities on employees. 5
It enumerates general and specific policies concerning employment and
working conditions which TNCs are urged to comply with. 6 The second,
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-up, 7 urge ILO Member-States (including those that have yet to
ratify the relevant LO Conventions) to respect, promote and realize, in
good faith and in accordance with the ILO Constitution, the fundamental
rights to freedom of association and to collective bargaining; the
elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; the effective
abolition of child labor; and the elimination of discrimination in respect to
employment and occupation. 8
The principles contained in these instruments have been characterized
as a reference point for best practices.' 9 However, they are of limited
14. International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning

MultinationalEnterprisesand Social Policy, adopted by the Governing Body of the International
Labor Office, 204th Sess., Nov. 1977, as revised by the TripartiteDeclaration of Principles
Concerning MultinationalEnterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess., Nov. 17, 2000
[hereinafter Tripartite Declaration], available at http://www.cauxroundtable.org/ILOTripartite

DeclarationofPrinciplesconcerningMultinationalEnterprisesandSocialPolicy.html (last visited Sept.
28, 2006).
15. Id. princ. 2.
16. These policies relate to employment promotion, equality of opportunity and treatment,
security of employment, job training, wages and benefits, safety and health in the workplace,
industrial relations in regards to right to freedom of association and to organize, collective
bargaining, consultation, grievances examination procedure and settlement of industrial disputes.
See id. princs. 13-59.
17. International Labor Organization, Declarationon FundamentalPrinciplesandRightsat
Work andItsFollow-Up, adopted by the International Labor Conference, 86th Sess., 18 June 1998
[hereinafter ILO Declaration on Rights at Work], available at http://www.cauxroundtable.org/
ILODeclarationofFundamentalPrinciplesandRightsatWork.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
18. Id. princ. 2. It is to be noted that the ILO has also developed the Guidelines on
OccupationalSafety and Health Management Systems (2001), availableat http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/protection/safework/cops/english/download/eOO0013.pdf (last visited Sept. 28,
2006).
19. Michele Colucci, Implementation and Monitoringof Codes of Conduct: How to Make
Codes of Conduct Effective?, in MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE SOCIAL CHALLENGES OF
THE XXIST CENTURY: THE ILO DECLARATION ON FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AT WORK-PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT 281 (Roger Blanpain ed., 2000).
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utility because they are unenforceable.2 ° While both instruments have a
procedure for the examination of disputes and a follow-up process, 21 they
do not have enforcement mechanisms and sanctions.22 The Declarationon
20. Bob Hepple, A Race to the Top?: InternationalInvestment Guidelines and Corporate
Codes of Conduct, 20 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 347, 354 (1999) (noting that the ILO Tripartite
Declaration "has been ineffective"). See also Colucci, supra note 19, at 281 (stating that the ILO
Tripartite Declaration "has not had the impact on international corporate behaviour hoped for by
many ofthose present at its creation"); John C. Anderson, RespectingHuman Rights: Multinational
CorporationsStrike Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 463,475 (2000) (noting that the effectiveness
of ILO Tripartite Declaration is limited partly because its "primary method" of enforcement is
persuasion by ILO officials).
21. See Procedurefor the Examination of Disputes Concerning the Application of the
TripartiteDeclarationof PrinciplesConcerning MultinationalEnterprisesand Social Policy by
Means of Interpretationof its Provisions,adopted by the Governing Body of the International
Labor Office at its 232d Sess., Geneva, Mar. 1986, Annexed to TripartiteDeclaration,supranote
14, at 19-20. See also ILO Declaration on Rights at Work, supranote 17 (calling for (1) an annual
follow-up concerning non-ratified conventions in the form of a yearly review of efforts made to
comply with the Declaration by ILO members which have not yet ratified all the fundamental
Conventions; and (2) a global report providing a dynamic global picture relating to each category
of fundamental principles and rights during the preceding four years). The dispute examination
procedure and follow-up process are not supervisory mechanisms but rather mechanisms for
espousing and promoting the fundamental aims of the instruments.
22. See Lance Compa & Tashia Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, Enforcing InternationalLabor
Rights Through Corporate Codes of Conduct, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 663, 671 (1995)
(stating that the ILO Tripartite Declaration "has no sanctions to back up its rules. Enforcement is
more a matter of discreet persuasion by ... ILO officials, or public embarrassment through the
media"); Hepple, supra note 20, at 354 (arguing that the Tripartite Declaration is "ineffective
because of the absence of sanctions to secure compliance with its standards, even by countries that
ratify them"); Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and
InternationalLaw: Where From Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (2003) (arguing that the problem
with the Tripartite Declaration is "its directory nature, the absence of any monitoring process, and
the lack of any implementation mechanism."); Christopher R. Coxson, Comment, The 1998 ILO
Declarationon Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Promoting Labor Law Reforms
Through the ILO as an Alternativeto Imposing Coercive Trade Sanctions, 17 DICK. J. INT'LL. 469,
500 (1999) (stating that under the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work "the ILO still lacks authority to impose legal or equitable remedies against employers or
governments for infringement of the Declaration's fundamental principles and core Conventions.").
The lack of enforcement mechanisms in ILO instruments has led some authors to characterize the
ILO as a toothless bulldog. See William B. Gould IV, Labor Law for a Global Economy: The
Uneasy Casefor InternationalLabor Standards, 80 NEB. L. REv. 715, 741 (2001) (stating that
"Although it is an exaggeration to characterize the ILO as a debating society, it has at its disposal
no meaningful remedies and sanctions beyond the potential for the offending country to be
castigated and chastised in the court of international public opinion."). But see JAGDISH N.
BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE TODAY 79 (2002).
[T]he common argument that ILO has no teeth, that is, no trade sanctions, is
wrong. I would argue that God gave us just not teeth but also a tongue; and a good
tongue-lashing, based on evaluations that are credible, impartial and unbiased, can
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FundamentalPrinciplesandRights at Work is voluntary and promotional
rather than regulatory. 3 Furthermore, it is not specifically addressed to
TNCs but rather ILO Member-States.24 The effectiveness of both
instruments is essentially dependent on the good faith commitment of
Member-States. Given the economic importance of TNCs, ILO MemberStates may not be enthusiastic about ensuring that TNCs comply with ILO
principles, particularly where they are perceived as an encumbrance on
business.
Like the ILO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has sought to influence the conduct of TNCs
through the OECD Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprises(Guidelines)
which were established in 19765 and substantially revised in 2000.26
Meant to apply to the conduct of business both inside and outside the
OECD enclave, 7 the Guidelines are recommendations that TNCs should
respect the human rights of those affected by their activities, in keeping
with the host government's international obligations and commitments.2 8
More specifically, the Guidelinesurge TNCs to: contribute to the effective
abolition of child labor and the elimination of all forms of forced or
compulsory labor; respect the right of their employees to form and
participate in trade unions; refrain from discriminating against employees
on grounds of race, color, sex, religion, political opinion, national
extraction, or social origin; and to take adequate steps to ensure
push a country into better policies through shame, guilt and the activities of NGOs
that act on such findings.
Id. On some of the institutional problems confronting the ILO, see generally Sean Cooney, Testing
Times for the ILO: InstitutionalReform for the New InternationalPoliticalEconomy, 20 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 365 (1999).
23. Hepple, supra note 20, at 355-56.
24. See ILO Declaration on Rights at Work, supra note 17, princ. 2 (declaring that all
Member-States of the ILO "have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the
organization, to respect, to promote and to realize, in good faith" the fundamental rights in the
Declarationon FundamentalPrinciples andRights at Work.
25. The first version of the Guidelines annexed to the OECD Declarationon International
Investment and Multinational Enterprises, OECD Press Release A (76) 20 of June 21, 1976,
reprintedin 15 I.L.M. 967, at 969 (1976).
26. See OECD Guidelinesfor MultinationalEnterprises,Revision 2000 [hereinafter OECD
Guidelines], availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf (last visited Nov. 28,
2006).
27. See id Statement by the Chair of the Ministerial,June 2000, at 5 (stating that "[t]he
Guidelines are recommendations on responsible business conduct addressed by governments to
multinational enterprises operating in or from the 33 adhering countries" and that "[tihey apply to
business operations world-wide.")
28. Id. at 19.
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occupational health and safety in their operations. 29 TNCs, the Guidelines
further urge, should ensure protection of the environment by conducting
their business in a manner conducive to the wider goal of sustainable
development.3 °
The Guidelines are a commendable effort by the OECD to promote
responsible corporate conduct. However, fundamental questions exist as
to whether they can achieve that objective. The Guidelines are
"remarkably weak" in comparison with the OECD financial instruments,
particularly those on trade and investment liberalization which appear to
have been designed with a view to promoting the economic interests of
TNCs.31 They are not regulatory instruments but rather mere
recommendations whose observation is voluntary and not legally
enforceable." Hence, they do not have any enforcement or monitoring
mechanisms.33 The language of the Guidelines is also largely precatory.
For the most part, the Guidelines are couched in broad and vague
language, lacking specificity and substance. Their ambit is equally
effectively limited by the use of claw-back phrases such as the exhortation
to TNCs to establish "a system of environmental management appropriate
to the enterprise."34 It is no surprise then that the Guidelineshave had little
positive impact on the corporate culture of OECD-based TNCs.35
The ineffectiveness of these mechanisms has led to renewed calls for
better international regulation of TNCs. While governments appear not to
be interested in that endeavor, civil society organizations are devising and
applying what have been termed "private governance regimes" which seek
to influence the behavior of TNCs through information disclosure and
dissemination. 36 A prominent example of such a regime is the Global
29. Id.at 21.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Hepple, supra note 20, at 361.
32. OECD Guidelines, supranote 26, at 17.
33. See Compa & Hinchliffe-Darricarrere, supranote 22, at 671 (stating that "[t]here is no
coercive enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the guidelines..."); Hepple, supra
note 20, at 354 (noting that "the OECD Guidelines have proven to be rich in principle, but weak
in enforcement."). Contra DUNCAN C. CAMPBELL & RICHARD L. ROwAN, MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES AND THE OECD INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS GUIDELINES 7 (1983) (arguing that because
the employment and industrial relations section of the Guidelines permit active labor union
involvement in the sense of being allowed to file complaints about noncompliance, the Guidelines
constitute an "enforced international regulation of multinationals.")
34. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 26, princ. 1, at 22.
35. See Deva, supra note 22, at 11 (stating that "the real impact of these guidelines in terms
of making the MNCs accountable for human rights violations is doubtful. The basic lacuna of the
guidelines lies in the lack of a strong enforcement system .. ")
36. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global GovernmentNetworks, GlobalInformationAgencies, and
DisaggregatedDemocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041, 1072 (2003).
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Reporting Initiative's SustainabilityReporting Guidelines which sets out
substantive performance and reporting standards for corporations.37 The
Global Compact (GC),38 perhaps the most prominent example of
international initiatives aimed at influencing the behavior of TNCs,
borrows substantially from these private governance regimes.
The GC came into being in 1999 at the request of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Kofi Annan.39 Since its inception, the GC has attracted praise as
well as criticism. Its proponents4" believe in its utility and argue that it is
"a very good vehicle to retrieve the moral purpose of business."4'
37. Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, available at
(last
http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/G30nline/DefiningReportContent/
visited Jan. 8, 2006). For analysis of some of these regimes, see Cynthia A. Williams, Civil Society
Initiativesand "Soft Law" in the Oil and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 457 (2004)
(discussing the Global Reporting Initiative, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human
Rights, and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative).
38. See U.N. Global Compact Web Site, at http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Oct.
2, 2006).
39. Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-GeneralProposes Global
Compacton HumanRights, Labour,Environment,in Address to World Economic Forumin Davos,
U.N. Press Release SG/SM/6881 (Feb. 1, 1999) [hereinafter Secretary-General Proposes],
availableathttp://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990201 .sgsm6881 .html (last visited Oct.
2, 2006). It is to be noted, however, that the GC is not the first attempt by the United Nations to rein
in TNCs. Sometime in 1974, the United Nations established the Commission on Transnational
Corporations and charged it with the duty of fashioning an international code of conduct for TNCs.
See United Nations, Resolution Establishing the Commission on Transnational Corporations,
reprintedin TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND WORLD ORDER: READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITIcAL ECONOMY 333-35 (George Modelski ed., 1979). The Commission subsequently
produced a draft Code of Conduct which, though revised, was never adopted by the international
community. See Ratner, supra note 7, at 458 (noting that the Draft U.N. Code of Conduct "was
effectively discarded in the early 1990s as the South retreated from assertive policies regarding
economic development"); Zia-Zarifi, supra note 7, at 84-85 (stating that "[a]ttempts to fashion
useful international codes of conduct for corporations have failed-after 20 years of effort, the
United Nations shelved its attempt to create a code in 1993"); Bunn, supra note 11, at 1281
(observing that "after years of negotiations and deep divisions between developing and
industrialized countries, the code was never brought for a vote" at the United Nations). For the draft
Code, see Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations,U.N. Doc.
E/C. 10/1982/6, June 5, 1982, reprintedin 22 I.L.M. 192 (1983). For the subsequent revision, see
Draft UnitedNations Code of Conduct on TransnationalCorporations,U.N. ESCOR, Spec. Sess.,
Supp. No. 7, Annex II, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/Rev.1 (1983), reprintedin 23 I.L.M. 626 (1984).
40. For a favorable view of the Global Compact, see generally John Gerald Ruggie, Trade,
Sustainabilityand Global Governance, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 297 (2002) [hereinafter Ruggie,
Trade]; John Gerald Ruggie, The Theory and Practiceof Learning Networks: CorporateSocial
Responsibility and the Global Compact, 5 J.CORP. CITIZENSHIP 27 (2002); Georg Kell & John
Gerard Ruggie, Global Markets and Social Legitimacy: The Case for the 'Global Compact,'
TRANSNAT'L CORP. 101 (1999).

41. Oliver F. Williams, The U.N. Global Compact: The Challengeand the Promise,14 Bus.
ETHics Q. 755, 761 (2004).
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However, critics, including many NGOs and business groups, regard the
GC with suspicion.42 Some NGOs charge that by entering into a
partnership with corporations, the United Nations, through the GC, affords
corporate wrongdoers an opportunity to launder their image. 43 The GC,
critics further allege, creates "undue corporate influence" at the United
Nations that weakens the work of intergovernmental processes and
agencies, while it "distracts Governments and the U.N. from the necessary
steps to establish an effective intergovernmental framework for corporate
But beyond that debate, the GC reflects the
accountability."
"unwillingness" of the United Nations and the international community "to
pursue compulsory corporate regulation."45 It also indicates the growing
preference for voluntary regulation or "moral persuasion," as opposed to
regulation through legal norms.4 6
This Article appraises the GC as an instrument for promoting corporate
responsibility and accountability. While acknowledging that the GC does
have potential to produce positive results, it nonetheless highlights several
problems and hurdles which it must overcome. Part II examines the goals
and structure of the GC, as well as the potential for successful outcomes.
Part II focuses on inherent problems facing the GC: its implicit but
42. See Philipp Mimkes, Bayer and the U.N. Global Compact: How and Why a Major
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Company "Bluewashes" Its Image, July 19, 2002, at
http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=3129 (last visited Oct. 2, 2006); Campaign for a
Corporate-Free U.N., Corporate Europe Observer (Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.corporateeurope.org/obersver7/un.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006). For a review of the
criticisms against the Global Compact, see Alexis M. Taylor, Note, The U.N. and the Global
Compact, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J.HUM. RTS. 975, 980-82 (2001).
43. See Transnational Resource & Action Center, Tangled Up in Blue: Corporate
Partnershipsat the UnitedNations (Sept. 2000), availableat http://www.corpwatch/downloads/
tangled.pdf (last visited Jan. 21,2006); Ralph Nader, Corporationsand the U.N.: Nike and Others
"Bluewash" Their Images, available at www.commondreams.org/views/091900-103.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2006).
44. Joint Civil Society Statement on the GlobalCompactand CorporateAccountability(July
2004), available at www.globalpolicy.org/reform/business/2004/07gcstatement.pdf (last visited
Oct. 2, 2006). See also Coalition Says Global Compact Threatens U.N. Mission and Integrity,
availableat http://www.commondreams.org/news2000/0725-08.htm (visited Oct. 2,2006); Kenny
Bruno, Perilous Partnerships:The U.N. 's Corporate Outreach Program, 21 MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR (2000) (reporting that NGOs are opposed to the Global Compact because of"a concern
that the partnerships will undermine the UN's ability to serve as a counterbalance to global
corporate power"), availableat http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm2000/00march/economics1.html
(last visited Oct. 2,2006); Third World Network, NGO Letter to U.N. Secretary Generalon Global
Compact (stating that "the purely voluntary nature of the Global Compact may distract from the
need for a legal firamework to hold corporations accountable internationally"), available at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/compact.htm (last visited Dec. 9, 2006).
45. Bunn, supra note 11, at 1283.
46. Id.
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erroneous assumption that the irresponsible behavior of TNCs is
attributable to their lack of knowledge about good governance practices,
and hence, its focus on "learning"; its non-regulatory nature; its inability
thus far to attract the support and participation of major TNCs; and the
non-inclusion of host communities in its dialogic process. Part IV
considers the significance of the GC initiative. Among others, it argues
that by empowering civil organizations to participate in its processes, the
GC may well provide an opportunity for NGOs to influence the behavior
of participating corporations. Finally, Part V recommends ways in which
the GC can be made more effective. In particular, it calls for the
distillation of best governance practices in a context-specific manner
because, what qualifies as "best practices" in one industry or region may
not be so in another.
II. THE GLOBAL COMPACT

In a speech delivered at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland, on January 31, 1999, Kofi Annan challenged world business
leaders to embrace and contribute to the achievement of an inclusive and
sustainable global market.4 7 The idea was to devise a governance compact
that will underpin and put a human face on the new global economy.48
With this speech the GC was born, although its operational phase was
formally launched on July 26, 2000."9
The GC invites business (that is, firms that sign on to it) to "embrace,
support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values in
the areas of human rights, labor standards, the environment, and anticorruption."5° It initially consisted of nine principles deduced largely from
international legal instruments. However, it has most recently been
revamped to include a tenth principle dealing with corruption. 1 It exhorts
business as follows:
Human Rights
1. Businesses should support and respect the protection of
internationally proclaimed human rights; and
47. See Secretary-GeneralProposes,supra note 39.
48. Id.
49. Guide to the Global Compact: A Practical Understanding of the Vision and Nine
Principles, at 4, available at http://www.uneptie.org/outreach/compact/docs/gcguide.pdf (last
visited Sept. 25, 2005) [hereinafter Guide to the Global Compact].
50. Global Compact, The Ten Principles,available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2005).
51. See id princ. 10.
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2. make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.
Labor
3. Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
4. the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labor;
5. the effective abolition of child labor; and
6. the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.
Environment
7. Businesses should support a precautionary approach to
environmental challenges;
8. undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental
responsibility;
9. encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally
friendly technologies.
Anti-Corruption
10. Businesses should work against all forms of corruption,
including extortion and bribery.52
Although as couched, these principles are sufficiently broad to
encompass most areas of international social concerns, there are questions
as to whether the GC, by its very nature, can induce positive substantive
changes in corporate behavior. We will return to this issue soon; for the
moment, let us briefly put the GC in context by reflecting on its goals.
Il. THE GOALS AND STRUCTURE OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT

The GC attempts to galvanize TNCs and other corporations into
compliance with international social standards. This much is apparent in
Kofi Annan's exhortation to the business community at Davos. According
to Mr. Annan,

52. See supranote 50. For interesting perspectives on the Global Compact, see Ambassador
Betty King, The U.N. GlobalCompact: ResponsibilityforHumanRights, LaborRelations,and the
Environment in Developing Nations, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 481 (2001); William H. Meyer &
Boyka Stefanova, Human Rights, the U.N. GlobalCompact, and Global Governance,34 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 501 (2001); Kell & Ruggie, supranote 40; Adelle Blackett, Global Governance,Legal
Pluralismand the DecenteredState: A Labor Law Critiqueof Codes of CorporateConduct, 8 IND.
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401, 441-46 (2001); Meaghan Shaughnessy, The United Nations Global

Compact and the Continuing Debate about the Effectiveness of Corporate Voluntary Codes of
Conduct, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 159 (2000).
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You can uphold human rights and decent labour and environmental
standards directly, by your own conduct of your own business....
You can make sure that in your own corporate practices you uphold
and respect human rights; and that you are not yourselves complicit
in human rights abuses. Don't wait for every country to introduce
laws protecting freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining. You can at least make sure your own employees, and
those of your subcontractors, enjoy those rights. You can at least
make sure that you yourselves are not employing under-age
children or forced labour, either directly or indirectly. And you can
make sure that, in your own hiring and firing policies, you do not
discriminate on grounds of race, creed, gender or ethnic origin. You
can also support a precautionary approach to environmental
challenges. You can undertake initiatives to promote greater
environmental responsibility. And you can encourage the
development and diffusion of environmentally friendly
technologies. 3
The GC is intended to provide corporations with a "common
framework" to deal with, and respond to, these concerns.54 In doing so, it
hopes to achieve two complementary goals. The first is to persuade
business to internalize its principles by making them an integral part of the
business culture, strategy, and operations of participating corporations.55
The second goal is to facilitate collective problem solving through
stakeholder cooperation.56 It is thus designed both to influence the
behavior of participants and to instigate normative changes in their
governance and policymaking processes.57
The GC operates through several engagement mechanisms: leadership,
dialogue, learning, partnership projects, and network/outreach. 8 The
mechanism of "leadership" demands commitment and transparency from

53. Secretary-GeneralProposes,supra note 39.
54. Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Business and Human Rights:
A ProgressReport (Jan. 2000), availableat http:www.ohchr.org/english/about/publications/docs/
business.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
55. U.N. Global Compact Office, How the Global Compact Works: Mission, Actors and

Engagement Mechanisms 2 (2003) [hereinafter How the Global Compact Works].
56. Id.
57. The Global Compact: Report on ProgressandActivities July 2002-July 2003, at 27, at

http://www.globalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/newsarchives/200307
2, 2006) [hereinafter Report on Progress].
58. Id.
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participating corporations. 9 It asks that those who manage the affairs of
corporations specifically commit to the GC's principles and that
corporations publicly report on actions undertaken in support of the
principles.6"
"Dialogue" is intended "both to influence policy-making and the
behaviour" of participants." It also enables participants to work together,
isolate problems and devise common solutions. 62 The "Learning"
mechanism which is "at the centre of the web of relationships" in the GC
is aimed at three goals: the identification and dissemination of critical
knowledge gaps, the sourcing and communication of good governance
practices, and the fostering of accountability and transparency by way of
public disclosure of relevant information through the GC's web portal.63
With the aid of the 'Learning Forums,' the GC puts principles-some
of which may be obtained through dialogues-to practice.' The learning
forums develop case studies of good corporate practices and how they are
put into practice. 65 Experience gained from the case studies is then shared
with other participants.66
Through "Partnership Projects," participants attempt to contribute to
the U.N. developmental goals and, in particular, achieve the GC's "goal
of providing more opportunities for the poor., 67 Finally, there is the
"networks/outreach" mechanism which is the primary medium of
engagement with stakeholders. Organized along regional, country or
industrial lines, the networks enable participants to discuss global
corporate responsibility issues "ina specific local and regional context,"
thus deepening the reach and impact of the GC.6 8
59. Id. at 23-26. See also Global Compact, The Global Compact: A Network ofNetworks, at
1,at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/8. 1/networkjpaper.pdf(last visited Dec.
5, 2005) [hereinafter A Network of Networks].
60. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 23-26.
61. How the Global Compact Works, supra note 55, at 5.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 33-39.
65. For these case studies, see FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE (2003), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/newsevents/8. 1/princ_prac.pdf (last visited Dec. 10,2005);
EXPERIENCES IN MANAGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABILITY (2003), available at http://www.
unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/8. 1/expMan.pdf(last visited Dec. 10, 2005); HIV/AIDS:
EVERYBODY'S BUSINESS (2003), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_

events/8.1/HIV AIDS.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2005).
66. How the Global Compact Works, supra note 55, at 5.
67. Id.
68. A Network ofNetworks, supranote 59, at 2. See also Reporton Progress,supranote 57,
at 41-51. For a discussion of these mechanisms, see Georg Kell, The Global Compact: Origins,
Operations,Progress, Challenges, 11 J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP 35, 39-41 (2003).
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Through these mechanisms, the GC not only provides an avenue for
dialogue between business and civil society,6 9 it also hopes to "weave a
web of values around the global marketplace,"7 foster cooperation
between business and civil society, and identify and promote the adoption
and dissemination of best practices.7" However, the GC is not a
prescriptive or conduct-regulating instrument.72 It is neither a code of
conduct nor a legally binding standard.73 Rather, as we have seen, it is a
platform for institutional learning, cultivation and dissemination of best
governance practices.74 In seeking to achieve its goals, the GC receives,
distills, refines and disseminates corporate governance information
through dialogue and responds to stimuli from its participants and other
stakeholders.75 The expectation is that good corporate practices which will
be distilled from the dialogues and disseminated to a wide spectrum of
stakeholders "will help drive out bad ones."76 In this sense, the GC could
be likened to a 'clearing house' for best corporate governance information
and practices. More significantly, the GC is essentially reflexive,
interactive and self-referential in character.77
The GC's strength and indeed its potential rest is in its reflexive or selfreferential character.78 By promoting dialogue between business and civil
society the GC fosters cooperation, partnership and solidarity among them.
Such dialogue provides a unique opportunity for civil society
organizations not only to influence corporate conduct towards ethical
behavior but also to "catalyze a profound transformation of global
governance."'7 9
69. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 5-9. See also ERROL MENDES & OZAY MEHMET,
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, ECONOMY AND LAW: WAITING FOR JUSTICE 143 (2003) (stating that the

Global Compact has "assisted in initiating dialogues between the global private sector, multilateral
organizations, and civil society groups on areas critical to the nine principles").
70. Ruggie, Trade, supra note 40, at 301.
71. See generally Guide to the Global Compact, supra note 49.
72. Id.at 10.
73. Id.
74. See Georg Kell & David Levin, The Global CompactNetwork An HistoricExperiment
in LearningandAction, 108 Bus. & SOC'Y REV. 151 (2003).
75. Harry Arthurs, Corporate Self-Regulation: PoliticalEconomy, State Regulation and
Reflexive Labour Law (unpublished paper, on file with author).
76. John Gerard Ruggie, Globalgovernance.net:The Global Compactas LearningNetwork,
7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 371, 373 (2001).
77. Arthurs, supra note 75.
78. For insight on the concept of legal reflexivity, see Gunther Teubner, Substantive and
Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 239 (1983); GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW
AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993).
79. Sustainability/The Global Compact, GearingUp: FromCorporateResponsibility to Good
Governanceand ScalableSolutions, at 1, availableat http:www.Sustainability.com/publications/
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The GC's self-referential character has the potential to enhance its
utility particularly in regards to its execution and implementation. As
Georg Kell, the Executive Head of the GC and indeed one of its most
outspoken proponents, has argued, the sharing of good corporate practices
among participating corporations will likely "promote action."" ° Its selfreferentiality could also promote accountability and transparency among
participants." For example, although the GC does not verify a
participating corporation's "Communication on Progress," (i.e., akin to a
social report82 ) the requirement that they publish such a communication,
describing how they supported the GC and its principles during the
previous fiscal year, in their annual report and other prominent public
documents 3 and in the GC web site 4 affords the civil society access to,
and the opportunity to challenge, the communication. A corporation whose
communication is demonstrated to be false through rebuttal may suffer
unpleasant market reaction to its products and services in addition to being
exposed to public shame.85 This may help drive home the need for
gearing-up.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
80. Kell, supra note 68, at 40.
81. Id.
82. The concept of social reporting is increasingly gaining acceptance as a regulatory tool.
However, proponents disagree on whether such reporting should be done voluntarily by
corporations or mandated by the state. See Archon Fung et al., Realizing Labour Standards,
BOSTON REV. (2001), availableat http://boston review.net/BR26.1/fung.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2005) (proposing a voluntary but independently supervised reporting scheme); Douglas M.
Branson, Progress in the Art of Social Accounting and Other Arguments for Disclosure on
CorporateSocial Responsibility, 29 VAND. L. REV. 539, 545 (1976) (suggesting that corporations
should be required to disclose their social responsibility practices, amongst other reasons, to
"enable investors to make sound investments decisions" and "to deter or to force revelation of
questionable acts and practices"); Cynthia A. Williams, The Security and Exchange Commission
and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999) (arguing that public
corporations should be required to make a report on their social responsibility to the Securities and
Exchange Commission); Frank R. Lopez, CorporateSocial Responsibility in a Global Economy
After September 11: Profits, Freedom, and Human Rights, 55 MERCER L. REV. 739, 770 (2004)
(arguing that U.S. corporations doing business abroad should be required to file a "Foreign
Operations Disclosure Statement" containing information about employee wages, working
conditions, and impact of their activities on the environment).
83. To ensure that the Communication on Progress is widely disseminated to a broad range
of stakeholders, participating corporations are also required to electronically link the
communication to the database of the GC's web site. See Report on Progress,supranote 57, at 3-4
& 24-25.
84. In fact, the Global Compact routinely publishes participants' Communication on
Progress. See U.N. Global Compact, Communication Progress: Communication on Progress
Overview, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/index.html (last visited Oct.
2, 2005).
85. EMEKA A. DURUIGBO, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 152 (2003) (stating that
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corporations to ensure the accuracy of their communication and thus, limit
corporate image laundering through association with the GC. It is thus
possible that effective rebuttals may ultimately weed out unfaithful
participants from the GC's process.
This observation must however be qualified. No doubt, public
disclosure of misbehavior could bring shame on the corporation, shame
which, in some cases, has led to positive change in corporate behavior.86
However, it is not at all certain that all or most corporations can be
publicly shamed. Corporations are not monolithic entities, they can exhibit
varying behavioral images and control public relations.87 Thus, whether or
not "shaming" affects the behavior of a corporation may depend on its
character. Some corporations are motivated entirely by profit-seeking to
disobey regulatory rules. Described by some as "worst apples"88 and by
others as "keen-eyed amoral calculators,"89 these corporations are unlikely
to be "shamed" by public knowledge of a falsehood in their
Communication on Progress.
Relatedly, the effectiveness of the shaming strategy may depend on the
corporation's product line. Where the corporation's products are
necessities as opposed to luxuries, the shaming device may not have much
effect because consumers may have little choice in purchasing the
products, irrespective of the falsity of the corporation's claims. This may
also be true of products whose origin or producers cannot be immediately
determined by consumers, because the products are unlabelled or mixed
with similar products before being sold to the public. One example is
diamonds from war torn regions in Africa. Once shipped out of Africa to
diamond-cutting centers in Europe, Tel-Aviv and other places, the socalled "conflict diamonds" are mixed with legitimate diamonds from
around the world; and, because they are unlabelled, it becomes difficult if
the GC "could serve as a useful tool for improving corporate behavior by shaming those
corporations whose performance is not adequate, thereby setting them on course for better
practices.").
86. See MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM 21-24
(2002) (describing how a law requiring manufacturers to disclose to the public how many pounds
of toxic chemicals they released to the air, water, or land forced Monsanto Corporation to commit
to reduce, and in fact reduced, its toxic emissions. Monsanto did so "because public access to
information about the company's toxic discharges threatened one of Monsanto's most important
assets-its reputation").
87. See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 64-65 (1982) (identifying four categories of corporations: those
that are "good apples," "best apples," "reasonably good apples," and "worst apples").
88. Id.
89. Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The Criminologyof the CorporationandRegulatory
Enforcement Strategies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 68 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas eds.,
1984).
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not impossible for the consuming public to know their country of origin
or their corporate producer. This is probably why "conflict diamonds"
from Africa and other places are still being sold in markets around the
world, notwithstanding various attempts by the Kimberley Process to halt
trade in illicit diamonds. 9°
But dialogue and the possibility of promoting ethical behavior through
publication of a participant's Communication on Progress are not all there
is to the GC. Corporations may also benefit from adherence to the GC's
principles and, in particular, the Communication on Progress. For
example, a corporation whose Communication on Progress demonstrates
compliance with the GC may ultimately be perceived by the public as a
socially responsible entity. In turn, such perception may translate into
increased public patronage of its products and services.9 This may itself
serve to entice other corporations to be socially responsible.
However, although the GC's emphasis on dialogue can produce
positive results, it is nonetheless a problematic strategy. While the GC
endorses rights compliance it does not claim to enforce rights. Rather,
compliance is to be achieved through learning and dialogue.
Unfortunately, this may create the erroneous impression that human rights
are not peremptory norms orjus cogens that must be observed by everyone
in society; rather, they become negotiable commodities between society
and business.92
Substantively, the GC has recorded measured successes since its formal
inauguration in 2000. 9" It has reportedly "accelerated policy change in
companies" and its mere existence is said to exert a "powerful influence"
on corporate participants to behave responsibly.94 Properly implemented,
the GC may well produce more positive results in future. While we await
full realization of its potential, the GC is regrettably at the moment beset
with operational challenges and legitimacy problems.

90. The Kimberley Process does not in fact label or certify individual diamonds as free from
conflicts. Rather, it certifies an entire shipment of rough diamonds-usually consisting of a number
ofparcels packaged in tamper resistant containers-as free from conflict diamonds. See Kimberley
Process Certification Scheme, http://www.kimberleyprocess.com:8080/site/?name=kpcs (last
visited Dec. 5, 2005).
91. Meyer & Stefanova, supra note 52, at 504 ("there is reason to hope that the Compact
could reward the behavior of responsible TNCs, while shaming at least some of the irresponsible
TNCs into better promoting human rights.").
92. Deva, supranote 22, at 19.
93. Kell, supra note 68, at 41-45.
94. McKinsey & Company, Assessing the Global Compact'sImpact (May 11, 2004), at 2,
availableathttp://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news-events/9. 1-news-archives/2004_06_09/
impass.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
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IV. PROBLEMS INHERENT IN, AND CONFRONTING, THE
GLOBAL COMPACT

A. (In)Appropriatenessof the Focus on Learningand Governance
The GC believes that there are "critical knowledge gaps" in corporate
governance. 95 Hence, its conveners envision "an incremental process of
learning and improvement" of governance practices. 96 However, the GC's
focus on learning and governance, rather than on regulation of corporate
conduct, appears to miss the point, at least in relation to TNCs.
It assumes that the social irresponsibility of TNCs in the developing
world stems from lack of proper governance or from lack of knowledge
about good business practices. This is rarely the case. While it is true that
the irresponsible behavior of TNCs is encouraged by several factors
including the regulatory incapacity of, and corruption in, developing
countries, the problem is equally attributable to the selective and
discriminatory observances of good practices by TNCs.
TNCs' choice of where to apply good business ethics and where to
disregard them appears curiously to be dependent on the geographical
location of their operations. TNCs generally behave well, or at least better,
when operating in developed countries. 97 This does not mean that
incidences of bad behavior by TNCs have not occurred, or are not
occurring, in developed countries.
The unsavory activities of Enron, Worldcom, and most recently,
Merck's marketing ofVioxx allegedly after knowing its adverse effects on
human health, are prime examples.98 But such bad behaviors, it appears,
95. How the GlobalCompact Works, supra note 55, at 5.
96. Williams, supra note 41, at 761.
97. In fact, the social misbehavior of TNCs is more acute in developing countries. See
Friends of the Earth International, supra note 12, at 2 (noting that "The most serious concerns tend
to be over corporate practices in poorer countries, where government and financial constraints have
made it more difficult for legal, environmental, health and safety standards to match those in
developed countries"); Bunn, supranote 11, at 1273 (asserting that the complicity of corporations
in human rights abuses, exploitation ofworkers, the flaunting ofenvironmental standards, and other
forms of corporate misconduct "can be particularly acute in developing countries"). In fact, the
misbehavior of TNCs in developing countries is well documented. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 5; Global Witness, The Logs of War, supra note 3; Global Witness, All the
Presidents'Men,supra note 3; Christian Aid, The Scorched Earth: Oil and War in Sudan (Mar.
2001), available at http://www.christian-aid.org.uk./indepth/0103suda/sudanoil.htm (last visited
Mar. 7, 2007).
98. See, e.g., Report: Vioxx Linked to Thousands of Deaths, MSNBC.com, Oct. 6, 2004,
availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6192603/print/l/displaymode/1098/ (last visited Oct.
2, 2006); Merck Yanks Arthritis Drug Vioxx, CNNMONEY.com, Oct. 6, 2004, available at
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are the exception and not the rule. Quite contrary, these same TNCs, aided
and abetted by host governments, often resort to irresponsible practices in
the execution of their business activities in developing countries. How else
do we explain Shell's apparent observance of good corporate governance
practices in its operations in the United States, Canada, and other parts of
the developed world while it wilfully disregards these practices in its
operations in places like Nigeria?99 This is indeed a worrisome trend
which, in all respects, should not be alluded to lightly or en passant.
Of course, the argument can be made that TNCs are involved in social
irresponsibility because the corporate governance culture of their
subsidiaries in the developing countries may be different from that of the
parent corporations which are often based in the developed countries. The
simple answer is based on the simple question: is management of the
subsidiary in the hands of its parent corporation? More often than not,
personnel from the parent corporation make up the management team of
the subsidiary. This is particularly so in technology-driven sectors, such
as the extractive industries, in which developing countries often lack the
necessary personnel and expertise. For example, the major oil TNCs in
Nigeria are headed by foreign expatriate staff seconded from, and
appointed by, the parent corporations overseas.'0 0 Therefore, the question
of differences in corporate governance culture between parent corporations
and their subsidiaries seldom arise in extractive industries.
The GC's focus on governance highlights another substantive problem:
its erroneous assumption about the universality of corporate governance
practices. To some extent, the GC adopts a universal but mythical
approach to corporate governance, in the sense that it assumes that
dialogue between its elite participants would produce best governance
practices which are universally applicable to all industries and countries
irrespective of differences in the nature of business and national cultures.
This approach, and the assumption underlying it, is not accurate. Some
governance practices, particularly those relating to the relationship
http://money.cnn.com/2004/O9/30/news/fortune5OO/merck/?cnn=yes(last visited Oct. 2, 2006);
Merck Yanks Vioxx from Shelves, CBS NEWS, Sept. 30, 2004, availableat http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2004/10/06/health/main647872.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
99. For a thorough analysis of Shell's irresponsible practices in Nigeria, see HUMAN RiGHTS
WATCH, supra note 5.
100. Indeed, after more than forty years of operating in Nigeria, Royal Dutch Shell has only
recently appointed the first Nigerian to head its subsidiary in the country, effective September 1,
2004. See Yakubu Lawal, Omiyi Becomes Shell's FirstNigerian ManagingDirector,GUARDIAN
(Nigeria), July 20, 2004, available at http://odili.net/news/source/2004/juU20/3.html (last visited
Oct. 2,2006); Mike Oduniyi, ShellAppoints FirstNigerianAD, THISDAYNEWS (Nigeria), July 20,
2004, available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/news/20040720news04.html (last visited Sept.
29, 2005).
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between directors and shareholders, may have universal resonance.
However, the reality is that corporate governance practices differ not only
between industries, given the divergent nature of global business, but also
between countries. What would amount to good governance practices in
one industry may not necessarily be so in another. Thus, it may be
difficult, if not impossible, for the GC to distill appropriate best
governance practices for all industries, given its current approach to
corporate governance.
Happily, the GC appears to recognize the danger in adopting a
universalist position. As noted below, it encourages networks of
participants along both geographical and industrial lines. Such specialized
networks are particularly necessary because some corporate governance
or responsibility issues, and indeed the solutions to them, may be
relative."'l What may amount to best practices that can resolve a problem
in the Tarkwa mining region of Ghana may not be so in the rain forests of
Colombia. By the same token, what a Western business person or NGO
may take as a solution to the Ogoni crisis in Nigeria may not be viewed as
an acceptable solution by the Ogonis. Regrettably, at this moment, all of
the GC's existing networks are country and regional networks, while
sectoral or industrial networks have yet to be created. 1
B. Non-Regulatory and Vague Nature of the Global Compact
Operationally, the utility of the GC appears to be compromised by its
vague nature. First, as mentioned previously, the GC is neither a regulatory
instrument nor a code of conduct. It is equally not intended to provide a
platform for verification of the social compliance of corporations that sign
on to it. 1°3

101. Claire Moore Dickerson, TransnationalCodes ofConduct Through Dialogue:Leveling
the Playing Fieldfor Developing-CountryWorkers, 53 FLA. L. REv. 611, 629-30 (2001).
102. For a list ofall ofthe Global Compact's networks, see A Network ofNetworks, supranote
59, at 15-18. See also Networks Around the World, availableat http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
NetworksAroundTheWorld/index.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
103. Guide to the Global Compact, supra note 49, at 4.
The Global Compact is a voluntary corporate citizenship initiative. As such, the
Global Compact is not a regulatory instrument-it does not "police" or enforce the
behaviour or actions of companies. Rather, the Global Compact relies on the
enlightened self-interest of companies, labour and civil society to initiate and
share substantive action in pursuing the principles upon which the Global
Compact is based.
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The GC does not therefore set any parameters for compliance. Neither
does it have specific standards to be met by its participants. Rather, it
consists of broadly couched criteria and benchmarks, the fine print of
which is left to the machinations of participating corporations.
In addition, some of its aspects, notably the criteria for participation,
are too fluid. The submission of a letter (endorsed by the board of
directors, where possible) expressing support for and commitment to the
GC by a chief executive officer of the corporation suffices for
participation.1 Once such a letter is submitted, the corporation is then
expected to do three things: set in motion changes to its business
operations so that the GC principles become part of its strategy, culture,
and day-to-day operations; publicly advocate the GC; and publish an
annual report or Communication on Progress indicating ways in which it
is supporting the GC and its principles. °5 However, applications for
participation are not vetted and it does not appear to matter to the GC that
an applicant corporation may be involved in rights violations even as it is
applying to join the GC.
Secondly, probably because it is not a regulatory instrument, the GC
has no enforcement or monitoring mechanisms. On the contrary, it relies
on self-enforcement by participating corporations. While the GC has
developed a Performance Framework for the purpose of assessing its
impact, °6 it does not provide standards or criteria for determining whether
a particular corporation is adhering to its principles. It is equally unclear
what the threshold is that a corporation must cross before it can be said to
be in violation of its commitments under the GC. °7 However, the GC is
not oblivious to these deficiencies. For example, it has recently announced
measures aimed at "assuring" its integrity "at all times.' 0 8 Under its
104. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 9.
105. Global Compact Guidelines for "Communication on Progress," available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/copguidelines.pdf(last visited Oct. 2,
2006).
106. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 2.
107. Ruggie, one of the architects of the GC, offers reasons why the GC adopted the learning
approach rather than proposing a code of conduct. First, the United Nations is unlikely to agree on
or adopt a code. Second, the United Nations does not have the logistical and financial capacity to
monitor global companies and their supply chains. Third, attempts to impose a code of conduct
would be counterproductive. Fourth, it is impossible to define many of the GC's principles with the
precision required for a viable code; and fifth, the constantly changing character of corporate
strategies, structures, and production process renders it exceedingly difficult to specify ex ante the
complete range of performance criteria and desired results that a code should include. See Ruggie,
Trade, supranote 40, at 303-04. See also Ruggie, supra note 76, at 373-74.
108. Global Compact: Note on IntegrityMeasures, June 29, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Integrity
Measures], availableathttp://www.unglobalcompact.com/docs/about-the gc/2.3/im_290605.pdf
(last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
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"integrity measures," failure to submit a Communication on Progress for
two consecutive years may lead to the labeling of a corporation as
"inactive" on the GC web site." 9 This may have serious implications for
the corporation. It could be denied privileges such as participation in GC
events and use of the GC name and logo.'
Also noticeable is the recent introduction of a complaint mechanism to
address allegations of systematic or egregious abuses of the GC's
principles.' The mechanism works this way: upon the receipt of a written
complaint the Global Compact Office (GCO) uses its judgment to
determine if the complaint is prima facie frivolous." 2 If so, no further
13
action is to be taken and the complainant is informed accordingly.'
However, if the complaint is found not to be prima facie frivolous, the
GCO forwards it to the corporation concerned with a request that it submit
written comments directly to the complainant, while forwarding a copy to
the GCO." 4 The GCO does not judge or determine the merits of a
complaint." 5 But it is to be kept informed of actions taken by the
corporation to address and remedy the subject matter of the complaint." 6
It may, however, provide "guidance and assistance" to the corporation in
resolving the complaint." 7
The complaint mechanism is essentially meant to facilitate mutual
resolution of problems rather than to compel compliance." 8 However, a
corporation's disregard of the mechanism is not without repercussion. A
refusal to engage in dialogue on the subject matter of a complaint within
three months of being notified by the GCO is grounds for declaring and

109. Id. at 2. As of Mar. 9, 2007, a total of 523 corporations were listed on the GC web site
as "inactive." See Inactive Participants, available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/
CommunicatingProgress/inactive_participants.html (last visited Mar. 9,2007). Note, however, that
the GC makes exceptions to its rules on Communication on Progress for "small and medium size
enterprises and other companies that may lack the capacity to report or face other barriers to
communicating fully." See Integrity Measures, supra note 108, at 2.
110. Integrity Measures,supra note 108, at 2.
111. Id. at 2-4.
112. Id. at3.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. The duty of the Global Compact Office is limited to providing guidance and assistance
"to the participating company concerned, in taking actions to remedy the situation that is the subject
matter of the complaint in order to align the actions of the company with its commitments to the
Global Compact principles." See Integrity Measures,supra note 108, at 3.
116. Id. at 3.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2 (the GC "is not now and does not aspire to become a compliance based
initiative").
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identifying a corporation as "inactive" on the GC web site. 19 More
ominously, if on the basis of a review of a complaint, the GCO determines
that the continued listing of the corporation as a participant is detrimental
to the GC's reputation and integrity, it may "remove" the corporation from
the list of participants and so indicate on the GC web site. 12' This
mechanism addresses, and could potentially eliminate, a principal criticism
of the GC: the opportunity it affords corporations to launder or "bluewash"
their public image through participation in the GC even though they may
be simultaneously violating human rights or degrading the environment. '21
C. Legitimacy Questions
The GC's legitimacy problems stem from two fronts: (a) its inability
thus far to gain the explicit support of governments in the developed
countries, and (b) the exclusion of at least one relevant constituency-host
communities-from direct participation in its process. Since its formal
launch in July 2000, the GC has attracted the support of several nations as
well as the participation of numerous corporations. 122 While this number
is impressive, its composition reveals some disturbing trends. First, only
a few are North American corporations. 123 Most major U.S. corporations
have so far failed to join the GC 124 and that is not likely to change soon.
U.S. corporations, some observers report, are afraid that joining the GC
could expose them to potential legal liabilities, particularly in relation to
the GC's labor rights provisions.125 They also do not think they have much
to gain by being associated with the United Nations under whose auspices
the GC is being implemented.126 Secondly, the geographical spread of the
nations actively supporting the GC point unfortunately in a disturbing
119. Id. at 4.
120. Integrity Measures, supra note 108, at 4.
121. CorpWatch, Greenwash + 10: The U.N. 's Global Compact, CorporateAccountability
and the Johannesburg Earth Summit (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.corpwatch.org/
downloads/gwl0.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter CorpWatch, Greenwash + 10];
Mimkes, supra note 42. Indeed, the Global Compact ran into moral trouble soon after its official
launch when it became known that a member of its Advisory Council had been the beneficiary of
the payment of excessive retirement benefit from the company he previously headed. See
CorpWatch, U.N.: Swedish BusinessmanLoses Job, availableat http://www.corpwatch.org/article.
php?id=1928 (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
122. There were 3960 corporations listed as participants as ofMarch 12, 2007. See Participant
Search Results, available at http://unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/search_
participant.html?submit-x=page (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
123. McKinsey & Company, supra note 94, at 11.
124. Williams, supranote 41, at 758.
125. McKinsey & Company, supra note 94, at 11.
126. Id.
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direction. As of July 2003, most of the "more than 50 countries" that had
officially embraced the GC are in the developing world.' 27 By contrast,
some developed countries have yet to formally endorse the GC 1although
28
they have, through the G8, offered "encouragement" to the GC.
The irony of this situation should not be lost on anyone. The less than
enthusiastic embrace of the GC by governments of the developed countries
reflects their continuing desire to shield their TNCs from international
regulation, even though, ironically, the GC does not regard itself as a
regulatory mechanism. This same attitude torpedoed the U.N. efforts to
fashion a code of conduct for TNCs in decades past, 129 and it may well
undermine the GC. Given that the developed countries often lecture other
countries on human rights, one would have expected them to
enthusiastically support initiatives meant to promote the observance of
international human rights principles. For the GC to make an appreciable
impact, it must enjoy the support of the international community,
particularly that of the developed countries which, as we all know, are
predominantly the domicile of global corporations. 3 °
The GC's legitimacy problems can also be found in its participatory
process.'' The GC is made up of agencies of the United Nations,
127. Report on Progress,supranote 57, at 1.See also McKinsey& Company, supra note 94,
at 11 (stating that the GC "has established a relatively strong presence in developing countries with
more than half of the Compact's formal participants headquartered outside the OECD.").
128. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 1. See also G8 FinanceMinistersSupport Global
Compact,availableat http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/news-archives/200305
19.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006); G8 Finance Ministers' Meetings: Finance Ministers' Statement,
Deauville, May 17,2003, availableathttp://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/fin030517_communique.
htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2006). It should be said though that some European countries such as Italy
have officially launched the Global Compact. See GlobalCompact Launchedin Italy, availableat
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/newsarchives/2004_05_05.html (last visited
Oct. 2, 2006).
129. For example, the Draft United Nations Code on TransnationalCorporationswas never
adopted by the United Nations because of "deep divisions between developing and industrialized
countries," divisions which revolved around whether or not the code should be obligatory. See
Bunn, supra note 11, at 1281. It is also worth noting that the U.N. Center on Transnational
Corporations was closed down in 1992 because of"heavy pressure from the United States and from
lobby groups like the International Chamber of Commerce." See Ellen Paine, The Road to the
Global Compact: Corporate Power and the Battle Over Global Public Policy at the United
Nations, availableat http://www.globalpolicy.org/reformi/papers/2000/road.htm (last visited Oct.
2, 2006).
130. See How the Global Compact Works, supra note 55, at 2 (stating that "[g]ovemments
provide the essential legitimacy and universality to the principles of the Compact.").
131. Blackett, supra note 52, at 445 (arguing in the context of labor rights that because "the
legitimacy of the participatory forum is dependent on its ability creatively to bring those most
concerned into its fold," the Global Compact ought to involve "those who can represent child
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representatives of business, labor, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and academia. 3 2 However, as mentioned previously, the GC
excludes host communities, a strategically vital constituency, from its
dialogic and learning processes. For example, since its inception, the GC
has not engaged host communities in Africa-who bear the brunt of antisocial behavior of TNCs-in its learning forums and dialogues even when
issues directly affecting these communities are being discussed.'3 3 By
adopting a top-top dialogic approach to the exclusion of host communities
the GC seems not to appreciate that corporations and host communities
may perceive corporate responsibility issues in fundamentally different
ways.
Some might argue that host communities' interests are ably represented
by NGOs thus obviating the need for their direct participation in the GC's
processes. There may well be some merit to this argument, since the
interests of NGOs are similar to those of host communities. However,
these interests are not necessarily synonymous. It would be naive then to
assume that the interests of host communities are better represented by
NGOs rather than by the communities themselves. Besides, NGOs, (and
in particular, international NGOs) are sometimes too distant from host
communities in the developing world and they do not always consult these
'
communities. 34
How can the GC dialogues "identify problems and find solutions"' 35 if
those who bear the negative brunt of corporate activities, that is, host
communities, do not directly participate in the dialogic process? Even if
the dialogues result in potential solutions, some may not be implementable
in a vacuum or in isolation from the host communities. This is precisely
the reason the GC ought to have included some host communities
(particularly indigenous peoples) in its process. Happily, the GC is in its
infancy and can be revamped so as to include and engage host
communities in its participatory process.
workers, forced laborers, and workers who face discrimination on grounds such as race, gender"
as participants in its dialogic process).
132. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 60-68.
133. For example, at its policy dialogue entitled "Regional Workshop on the Role of the
Private Sector in Zones of Conflict," held in Johannesburg, South Africa in November 2002,
participants were "country managers of international and domestic companies with NGOs,
government and representatives from UNDP country offices." The African communities that have
consistently suffered as a result of these conflicts were not invited to participate in the process that
was supposedly meant to find solutions to their plight. See id. at 28-29.
134. See Marina Ottaway, Reluctant Missionaries, 125 FOREIGN POL'Y 44, 54 (July/Aug.
2001) (noting that NGOs often speak for host communities in developing countries even though
"they never consulted" with these communities).
135. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 8.
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Of course, the GC could face a number of serious practical difficulties
were it to allow direct participation of host communities. How do we
determine which communities qualify for participation? If the Ogonis of
Nigeria were to participate in the GC who would speak for them? Should
they participate in every aspect of the GC? If not, what is the appropriate
level of participation? These questions assume greater significance
because host communities do not necessarily have homogenous interests.
But such potential obstacles ought not to stand in the way of at least some
limited level of direct participation by host communities. Otherwise, the
GC will remain distant from the very host communities whose
vulnerabilities it hopes to alleviate.
Aside from the above, other difficulties beset the GC. For example,
given the deep-rooted U.N. bureaucracy, it is questionable whether the
U.N. Global Compact Office, and other U.N. agencies involved in the
governance of the GC, are institutionally capable of managing rapid
changes in normative corporate culture, changes which the GC would
obviously have to come to terms with if it is to realistically hope to have
a shot at success.136 Besides, the GC might be spreading itself too thin by
pushing its boundaries dangerously toward the murky waters of aid and
development. Poverty alleviation and corporate philanthropy are already
becoming part and parcel of the GC.'37 For example, the pharmaceutical
giant, Novartis, is implementing an "access to medicines" initiative as part
of its commitment to the GC, 3 8 an initiative which is said to "reach well
beyond the workplace and local communities to a broader 'sphere of
influence' embracing patients far beyond the traditional stakeholder
' Similarly, automakers DaimlerChrysler and Volkswagen
boundaries."139
have instituted HIV/AIDS community outreach programs for employees
and host communities. 40 The GC itself encourages corporate philanthropy
because, as mentioned earlier, it aims to provide "more opportunities for
136. In theory, the GC is self-administering by those who participate in it. However, several
U.N. agencies are involved in the governance of the GC. These are the U.N. Environment Program,
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Labor Organization, U.N.
Development Program, and U.N. Industrial Development Organization. See id. at 17-19.
137. Through its Least Developed Countries initiative first launched in Ethiopia, the GC
solicits business proposals from participants "in line with the country's priorities for poverty
alleviation." Id. at 30-31.
138. Lee A. Tavis, Novartis andthe U.N. GlobalCompactInitiative,36 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L
L. 735, 752-57 (2003), reprintedin FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE, supra note 65, at 5-30.
139. Id. at 752.
140. Bernhard Seitz et al., DaimlerChryslerSouth Africa-Dealing with the Effects of
HIV/AIDS on Human and Social Capital,in HIV/AIDS: EVERYBODY'S BuSINESS, supra note 65,
at 41-61; Claudio B. Boechat et al., Volkswagen in the Global War Against HIV/AIDS, in
HIV/AIDS: EVERYBODY'S BuSINESS, supra note 65, at 89-119.
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the poor" and invites participants to partner with the United Nations in
executing developmental projects. 4 '
No one is against corporate philanthropy. Neither are we against
corporate initiatives aimed at combating the scourge of our time,
HIV/AIDS, whether within the workplace or in the community at large.
Rather, the objection relates to the use of the GC as a platform for
implementing these initiatives. Given its core objectives, the GC can
hardly be said to be an appropriate platform for corporate philanthropy.
Yes, the argument can be made that philanthropic healthcare programs fit
within the GC's principles relating to human rights. Indeed,
DaimlerChrysler has stated that its HIV/AIDS program is being
implemented in support of the GC's human rights principles.' 4 2 But while
corporate philanthropy is no doubt laudable, and while it is appropriate for
corporate participants to develop healthcare programs to assist their
employees infected with HIV/AIDs and other diseases, the
"philanthropization" of the GC maybe counterproductive because it could
potentially dilute, or distract attention from, the GC's articulated main
goals: the protection of human rights, labor rights, and the environment.
Besides, it makes little sense to philanthropize the GC because the United
Nations already has within its fold a number of agencies under whose
auspices corporate philanthropy,
including HIV/AIDS initiatives, can be
143
and are undertaken.
Apart from diluting its mandate, the GC's venture into philanthropy
poses another problem. It increases the risk of the GC being hijacked, if
not captured, by business because it affords a unique opportunity for
corporations to pass themselves off as socially responsible entities while
they may, in fact, be socially deviant. It would certainly make for good
public relations for a corporation to be seen providing HIV/AIDS drugs to
141. How the Global Compact Works, supranote 55, at 5.
142. Seitz et al., supra note 140, at 42.
143. These agencies include the World Health Organization. See WHO and HIV/AIDS,
available at http://www.who.int/hiv/en/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2007); see UNHCR, Protecting
Refugees: Refugees and HIV/AIDS, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/401915744.html,
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007); see UNICEF, HIV/AIDS and Children, available at
http://www.unicef.org/aids/index.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2007); see UNDP, HIV/AIDS:
Respondingto the World's Most Serious Development Crisis,availableathttp://wwwundp.org/hiv
(last visited Feb. 26, 2007); see ILOAIDS, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
protection/trav/aids/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). In particular, the U.N. Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO) is "involved in mobilizing the business communities in several countries
to support HIV/AIDS activities." See The UnitedNations at Work: The FightAgainst AIDS (June
2001), availableathttp://www.un.org/ga/aids/ungassfactsheets/pdf/fsunatwork-en.pdf(last visited
Feb. 28, 2007). The efforts of these agencies are coordinated by the Joint U.N. Program on
HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), available at http://www.unaids.org/en/AboutUNAIDS/default.asp (last
visited Feb. 26, 2007).
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poor victims in Africa and other places under the auspices of the GC while
profiting elsewhere at the expense of other, equally vulnerable victims.
V. OVERALL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GLOBAL COMPACT

Despite these various problems the GC does have the potential to
produce positive outcomes, particularly if implemented in good faith by
participants. Beyond that, the GC's significance lie in at least four areas.
First, its establishment is a subtle acknowledgment that previous
international regulatory efforts such as the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises,'" ILO Declarations and Convention,'45 and
corporate self-regulation itself are inadequate to address the endemic
misbehavior of TNCs in developing countries. In effect, the GC provides
confirmation for the view that corporate irresponsibility has defied past
regulatory initiatives. If these prior initiatives were effective, there would
have been no need for the GC. Secondly, its principles appear to enjoy
widespread acceptance and are rapidly coalescing
into "reference points"
146
accountability.
and
responsibility
corporate
for
Thirdly, the GC allows the participation of local and international civil
organizations in its processes, thus in a way empowering them in the
governance of TNCs. Membership in the GC affords organized civil
groups, and in particular public interest NGOs, an opportunity to liaise and
consult with, and to influence the governance of, TNCs. It also affords
them an avenue to scrutinize the Communication on Progress filed by
participating corporations. As mentioned earlier, the fear that inaccuracies
in a Communication on Progress will be exposed by civil society may
encourage corporations to file accurate reports, and thus discourage
corporate image laundering through association with the GC.
The GC's empowerment of NGOs is particularly significant because
it strikes at the core issue in any society's attempt to regulate TNCs: how
to restrain the "unbridled powers" of TNCs.' 47 To a large degree, the
question of corporate responsibility or accountability revolves around, and
stems from, the imbalances in power between business and society. 48 That
144. OECD Guidelines, supra note 26.
145. TripartiteDeclaration,supra note 14; ILO Declaration on Rights at Work, supra note
17.
146. Report on Progress,supra note 57, at 1
147. Hepple, supra note 20, at 362.
148. Some corporations are known to be richer than the countries in which they do business.
For example, a report by the Institute for Policy Studies has revealed that of the 100 largest
economies in the world 51 are corporations while only 49 are countries. Also, the combined sales
of the top 200 corporations are bigger than the combined economies of all countries minus the
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imbalance not only explains the involvement of TNCs in irresponsible
behavior in developing countries but, more significantly, it sheds light on
why regulation has been ineffective.
In the context of the African extractive industries, for example, what
counts is the TNCs' wealth, technological know-how, and economic
importance to the host African countries. The enfeebled and poor African
countries often lack the capacity, if not the political will, to regulate the
financially powerful TNCs. This is perhaps expected given the enormity
of the financial powers of the major TNCs which dominate Africa's
extractive industries.
In 2002, for example, Exxon raked in revenues of$182 billion U.S. and
made a profit of $11 billion U.S., the highest for any TNC in that year;
Shell grossed a revenue of $179 billion U.S. and returned a profit of $9
billion U.S.; British Petroleum earned a revenue of $179 billion U.S. with
a profit of $7 billion U.S.; Total Fina Elf made $97 billion U.S. as
revenues and turned in a profit of $6 billion U.S.; and Chevron Texaco had
revenues of $92 billion U.S. while making $1 billion U.S. as profits. 4 9 The
financial powers of these TNCs enable them to dominate and control
poverty-stricken and economically deficient host African States. Hence
today, TNCs not only influence regulatory laws in Africa, they also
promote a culture of non-enforcement of laws.
The power of TNCs is not felt at the level of the host countries alone.
Depending on the extent of their integration with their home (usually
developed) economies, TNCs are also able to exert influence on both their
home countries and the international community (the latter through the
agency of the powerful home governments of the TNCs), in order to avert
national and international regulation. 5 ° Indeed, as one notable author
points out, "there is considerable evidence to suggest that home states are
increasingly prepared to formulate both domestic and international
economic policy with the interests of their home-based [TNCs] in
biggest 10. See Sarah Anderson & John Cavanagh, Top 200: The Rise of CorporateGlobal Power,
availableat http://www.ips-dc.org/reports/top200text.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
149. Global Policy Forum, Major Oil CompaniesAmongLargest TransnationalCorporations,
availableat http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/tncs/oiltable.htm (last visited Dec. 16,2005). Oil
and gas TNCs have consistently earned high revenues and profits. See id.; Global Policy Forum,
The World's 100 Largest Public Companies,available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/
tncs/2004/biggestcorp.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2006); Exxon Mobil Sets Profit Record, CNN
MONEY.com, Jan. 30, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/30/news/companies/
exxon earns/index.htm?cnn=yes (last visited Oct. 2, 2006); John Holusha, Exxon Mobil Posts
Largest Annual Profitfor U.S. Company, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2006, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/01/30/business/30cnd-exxon.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
150. Paine, supranote 129 (reporting that "heavy pressure from the United States" and other
corporate lobbyists forced the United Nations to end monitoring of transnational corporations).
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mind."'' Part of the evidence is the attitude of the developed countries in
protecting the investment of their TNCs in foreign countries through
binding and enforceable international rules, while simultaneously opposing
the imposition of binding international social duties on the TNCs. TNCs
power, and by extension their influence on national and international
regulatory policy, is likely to increase given the current pace of
globalization
in the world economy, which is itself driven and dominated
52
by TNCs.1
This being so, initiatives aimed at influencing or regulating the conduct
of TNCs would, to be effective, have to take cognizance, and address the
issue, of power distribution and power alignment between business,
government, and civil society. In other words, if anything is to be done
about corporate irresponsibility, effective counterbalancing, or restraining
forces to corporate power will have to be creatively devised by society.
One promising, though not exclusive, restraining force is in organized civil
society, particularly NGOs. NGOs have the ability to organize social
campaigns against corporate abuses, and have exerted pressures on
governments and corporations themselves to observe and promote social
standards.' 53 The World Bank Inspection Panel, for example, was
151. Peter T. Muchlinski, "Global Bukowina" Examined: Viewing the Multinational
Enterprise as a TransnationalLaw-Making Community, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, 79,

91 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
152. Id.at 91-92.
Whether such a position [to influence regulatory policy in favour of TNCs] is
taken by a home state depends largely on the degree to which MNEs
[Multinational Enterprises] are "embedded" in the economic policy-making
system of that state. The closer the relationship between MNEs and the major
economic policy-makers of their home states ...the greater the likelihood that
MNEs will be able to influence, if not to set, the economic policy agenda of the
home state. This power becomes increasinglyimportant as national economies
become more internationalizedas a result of the activities of MNEs. The Policymaker's prioritymay then become one of ensuring that regulatory conditions in
the internationalizingeconomy arefavourable to its home-basedfirms. The result
may be an increased incidence of home state lobbying on behalf of and in
associationwith, home-basedMNEs for changes in host state and international
regulatoryenvironments.

Id.(emphasis added).
153. See David Tolbert, Global Climate Change and the Role of International NonGovernmental Organisations,in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 95 (Robin

Churchill & David Freestone eds., 1991); ALEXANDRE KIss & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 133-38 (2d ed. 2000). See also David Reed, The Global Environment
Facilityand Non-Governmental Organizations,9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 191 (1993); Robin
Broad & John Cavanagh, The CorporateAccountability Movement: Lessons & Opportunities,23
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established primarily in response to NGO pressures on the World Bank.154
NGOs also mobilize domestic and international public opinion by
disseminating information about social atrocities committed by
corporations. In addition, they liaise and collaborate with regulators,'55
legislative bodies, governments, international institutions and willing
corporations to find solutions to corporate irresponsibility.'56
Perhaps more significantly, NGOs have been actively engaged in
establishing and disseminating principles on the ethical conduct of
business. For example, Amnesty International has developed the Human
Rights Principlesfor Companies. 1 In addition, NGOs such as the Global
Reporting Initiative, and Ethical Trading Initiative have initiated social
reporting guidelines and standards which are today widely used by
F. WORLD AFF. 151 (1999); Debora Spar & James Dail, Of Measurementand Mission:
Accounting for Performance in Non-Governmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 171, 172
(2002).
154. See INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1118 (Edith B. Weiss et al eds.,
1998); Saladin Al-Jurf, ParticipatoryDevelopment and NGOs: A Look at the World Bank, 9
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 179 (1999). See also Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte, The
World Bank Inspection Panel:A Record of the FirstInternationalAccountability Mechanism and
Its Rolefor Human Rights, 6 HuM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (1999) (stating that "[tlhe Panel's creation was the
result of both internal and external demands on the Bank to be more transparent and accountable
in its operational work..."). For analysis of the relationship between the World Bank and NGOs,
see Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank and Non-Governmental Organizations,25 CORNELL
INT'LL.J. 623 (1992).
155. See JOSEPH F. DIMENTO, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND AMERICAN BUSINESS: DILEMMAS
OF COMPLIANCE 148 (1986).
FLETCHER

Support groups generate and transfer information to both regulators and regulated
businesses. Their function in our compliance framework may be to create new
information, to repeat or highlight information already available to government
and business, or to fill in gaps in the regulatory process which reflect information
deficiencies. They set the backdrop for business-government interactions. They
are the entities which care about either special or general compliance.
Id.
156. See David F. Murphy & Jem Bendell, New Partnershipsfor SustainableDevelopment:
The ChangingNatureof Business-NGORelations, in THE GREENING OF BUSINESS INDEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: RHETORIC, REALITY AND PROSPECTS 216 (Peter Utting ed., 2002); Chiara Giorgetti,
From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement of Non-Governmental Organizations in the
Negotiations on Climate Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 201 (1999). For the view that curbing the
antisocial behavior ofbusiness requires collaboration between various entities including NGOs, see
Barbara C. George & Kathleen A. Lacey, A Coalition of IndustrializedNations, Developing
Nations, Multilateral Development Banks, and Non-Governmental Organizations:A Pivotal
Complement to CurrentAnti-Corruption Initiatives, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 547 (2000).
157. Amnesty International, Human Rights Principles for Companies (Al Index ACT
70/01/98), availableathttp://web.amnesty.org.library/print/ENGACT700011998 (last visited Oct.
2, 2006).
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corporations. 5 With adequate empowerment to participate in the
regulatory process NGOs are likely to do much more. By promoting
collective problem solving through the involvement of various
stakeholders, the GC may well open further avenues for NGOs to
influence corporate conduct.
Fourthly, the GC is akin to a "partnership" or "contract" between the
United Nations and corporations. 5 9 Why is this significant? The
corporation has traditionally been regarded as not being a subject of
international law. 6 ° Rather than conferring status on TNCs, international
law takes the position that the doctrine of state responsibility-which
imposes an obligation on State Parties to international covenants and
treaties to regulate private conduct so as to ensure respect for, and
observance of, the rights guaranteed under them-is the appropriate
mechanism through which international
law is to influence, albeit
61
indirectly, private corporate conduct.1
Although the conventional perspective is gradually being assaulted and
perhaps theoretically demystified,'62 it remains the dominant norm in
158. Global Reporting Initiative, Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, available at
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/529105CC-89D8-405F-87CF- 12A601AB383 1/0/
2002_Guidelines ENG.pdf(last visited Nov. 14, 2006); Ethical Trading Initiative, The Base Code,
availableat http://www.ethicaltrade.org/Z/lib/base/code-en.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
159. Kofi Annan envisioned the Global Compact as "a creative partnership between the United
Nations and the private sector." See Secretary-GeneralProposes,supra note 39.
160. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (6th ed. 2003) (stating
that "[i]n principle, corporations of municipal law do not have international legal personality");
Francois Rigaux, Transnational Corporations,in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND
PROSPECTS, 121, 129 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991) (stating that "transnational corporations are
neither subjects nor quasi-subjects of international law"); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN A DIVIDED WORLD 103 (1988) (arguing that states have not upgraded TNCs to international
subjects and thus, that "multinational corporations possess no international rights and duties" under
international law).
161. The United Nations has reiterated the primacy of state responsibility in the protection of
international human rights by declaring that:
Each State has a prime responsibility and duty to protect, promote and implement
all human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia,by adopting such steps as
may be necessary to create all conditions necessary in the social, economic,
political and other fields, as well as the legal guarantees required to ensure that all
persons under its jurisdiction, individually and in association with others, are able
to enjoy all those rights and freedoms in practice.
See Declarationon the Right and Responsibilityof Individuals, Groups and Organsof Society to
Promoteand Protect UniversallyRecognized Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms, G.A.
Res. 53/144, U.N. GAOR, 1998 art. 2(1) (emphasis in original).
162. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How WE
USE IT (1994).
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international law and practice. Hence, the reality today is that corporations
"bear almost no obligations under public international law." 163 Indeed, to
the degree that international law touches on the corporation, it is largely
concerned with protection of the rights and interests of the corporation as
opposed to the imposition of duties on it." This position is unlikely to be
altered anytime soon because it suits the interests of both TNCs and their
developed home countries who, in any event, are the effective makers of
international law.'65 It shields and "immunizes" TNCs "from direct
accountability to international legal norms,"' 66 thus ensuring protection of
the economic interests of TNCs and by extension, the interests of their
home countries.
However, by entering into a "compact" with corporations and assigning
them roles relating to human rights, labor rights, environmental protection,
and the eradication of corruption, the GC appears to have unwittingly
elevated the status of corporations within the context of the United
Nations, if not international law itself. Admittedly, the U.N. SecretaryGeneral may not have had this in mind when he enunciated the GC; but it
is an inference which can safely be drawn from the GC. On this score, the
GC is a step in the right direction because the idea that TNCs are not
subjects of international law appears unsupportable in this day and age,
when global economic realities have thrust TNCs to the forefront in
designing international economic rules coupled with the ever expanding
ambit of corporate activity. The time may indeed be ripe for a reconceptualization of the status of TNCs in international law in such a
manner that international law rights and duties can lawfully be defined for
them. 167 This much was recognized by the U.N. Human Rights SubCommission when it recently68proposed a binding regime of human rights
duties on corporate entities.
163. Saman Zia-Zarifi, Suing Multinational Corporations in the US. for Violating
InternationalLaw, 4 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 81, 84 (1999).

164. Menno T. Kamminga, Holding MultinationalCorporationsAccountable for Human
Rights Abuses: A Challengefor the EC, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 553, 556 (Philip Alston
ed., 1999).
165. For an interesting analysis of law-making process in international law, see W. Michael
Reisman, InternationalLawmaking: A Processof Communication, 75 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
101 (1981).
166. Jonathan I. Charney, TransnationalCorporationsandDevelopingPublic International
Law, DUKE L.J. 748, 767 (1983).
167. See generally ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 89-133
(1993); LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (Menno T.
Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
168. U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the
Responsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporationsand Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
HumanRights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26,2003), availableathttp://www.
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VI. ENHANCING THE GLOBAL COMPACT

We have noted various problems and difficulties confronting the GC.
Many, though substantial, are transient and perhaps expected as part of the
GC's birthing problems. Happily, the GC appears to be tackling some of
the problems head-on. For example, it has recently announced substantive
modifications and changes to its governance structure, processes, and
procedures. 6 9 Of particular significance is the new integrity and
accountability policy. As mentioned previously, there are now provisions
for de-listing errant corporations from participation. 7 ° More significantly,
aggrieved persons, including host communities of TNCs, can now file
complaints about egregious breaches of the GC's principles with the
GCO.' 7 ' Another interesting innovation is the Policy on the Use of the
Global Compact Name and Logo.'72 Under the policy, use of the GC logo
by participants is permitted
only in the context of their activities promoting the Global Compact
and its goals, but not in any manner that suggests or implies that the
Global Compact Office has endorsed or approved of the activities,
products, and/or services of the organization, or that the Global
Compact Office is the source of any such activities, products,
and/or services. 173

The policy is apparently meant to preserve the GC's independence. If
effectively implemented, it may also prevent corporate "bluewashing" or

1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/norms-Aug2003.html and at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.
nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2En?Opendocument (both sites last visited Nov. 14,
2006).
169. The Global Compact's Next Phase (Sept. 6, 2005), available at http://www.
corporate-accountability.org/eng/ documents/2005/nov_2005 the new governance structure of
theglobal compact bykarsten nowrot_pdf 798 kb.pdf(last visited Oct. 2, 2006). For analysis
of these changes, see Karsten Nowrot, The New Governance Structure of the Global
Compact-Transforming a "Learning Network" into a Federalized and Parliamentarized

TransnationalRegulatoryRegime, availableathttp://www2.j ura.uni-halle.de/INSTITUT/Heft47.
pdf. (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
170. Integrity Measures, supra note 108, at 3.
171. Id. at 2-4.
172. Policy on the Use ofthe Global Compact Name and Logo (Mar. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/about_thegc/2.3/gclogo_pol.pdf(last visited Oct. 2,2006).
173. Id at 1.
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image laundering, which as noted earlier, has been the principal concern
of critics.174
Some have argued that with its recent fine-tuning, the GC has
abandoned "to a large extent its original concept as a mere dialogue forum
and learning network" and that instead, it can now be characterized as a
"transnational regulatory regime."175 Despite its recast, the GC remains at
the moment no more than a moral suasion to the business community to
commit to, and observe, the ten principles in conducting their internal
business affairs. But the idea that mere moral suasion will encourage
corporate virtue is unrealistic and in fact a myth. To put it bluntly, moral
suasion is not enough to ensure compliance with social standards. Thus,
the GC must look beyond the moral consciousness of business-if indeed
it has any-and insist on substantive changes in corporate behaviour.
As a self-referential instrument, the GC must constantly be fine-tuned
to enhance prospects for achieving its goals. For instance, membership in
the GC should not be an all-comers affair. Rather, there ought to be a
minimum social compliance threshold for participation. Equally, the GC
ought to broaden the scope of its participants to include host communities
in appropriate cases, because direct participation of all constituencies at
the epicenter of those social concerns that inform the GC is crucial to its
viability and utility. This could easily be achieved by enlarging the range
of participants at the GC's various regional workshops and Networks to
include representatives of host communities. Just as its dialogues may
foster the dissemination of best practices, direct involvement of host
communities in the GC's process may engender trust between
corporations, the communities and the GC.
Similarly, corporate governance practices could be better distilled and
disseminated if industries were disaggregated. Rather than lumping all
industries together, GC ought to devise industry-specific dialogues and
networks with a view to best corporate governance practices suitable for
each particular industry. Indeed, the GC is not entirely oblivious to the
need for such specialized dialogues. It encourages formation of networks
along country, regional, and industrial lines.'76 Sadly, as noted previously,
industry-specific networks have yet to come on line.
These normative changes become more important because the utility
of the GC may ultimately depend not so much on its participants but on the
universality of its appeal and acceptance. If the GC's principles are
174. See Transnational Resource & Action Center, supra note 43; Nader, supra note 43;
CorpWatch, Greenwash + 10,supra note 121.
175. Nowrot, supranote 169, at 37.
176. How the Global Compact Works, supranote 55, at 6. See also A Network of Networks,
supra note 59.
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continuously accepted and relied upon by the international community,
they may well in future coalesce or gel into hard law in the form of an
enforceable international regime for corporate responsibility. Even if this
hope does not materialize, general acceptance and continuous use of the
principles may effect changes in corporate conduct in much the same way
as a formal or binding code of conduct.'77
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article highlights potentials and problems confronting the GC.
While they may appear intractable to some, it may well be possible to
overcome these problems in the future. For the moment, the GC is
inadequate because it offers mere moral suasion to the business
community. On the positive side, the GC is a laudable, albeit modest
effort. Its advent is an implicit recognition that prior international and
multilateral regulatory initiatives were inadequate to regulate effectively
the conduct of TNCs. But if the GC is to make appreciable impacts on
corporate governance and culture, and by implication corporate
responsibility, it ought to do certain things. It should at the very least
stipulate a minimum social compliance threshold for participation. If
nothing else, this would indicate to prospective corporate participants that
the GC is not an all-comers affair and that they must meet a minimum
standard of social behavior before they can be considered for membership.
Equally, the GC should directly engage host communities in appropriate
cases. That way, it may earn the trust of such communities. An explicitly
binding international code of conduct for business may be preferred to the
voluntary initiative of the GC; but at this point the GC remains the best
reality with which a globalizing TNC world can be made to work.

177. Seymour J. Rubin, TransnationalCorporationsandInternationalCodes of Conduct: A
Study of the Relationship Between InternationalLegal Cooperationand Economic Development,
10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1275, 1286 (1995) (stating that "[a] generally accepted set of
standards may eventually have as significant effect as a more formal commitment").
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